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Summary 
On July 1, 2007, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA—previously known as fast track) expired. TPA 
is the authority Congress grants to the President to enter into certain reciprocal trade agreements, 
and to have their implementing bills considered under expedited legislative procedures, provided 
the President observes certain statutory obligations. TPA defines how Congress has chosen to 
exercise its constitutional authority over a particular aspect of trade policy, while giving the 
President added leverage to negotiate trade agreements by effectively assuring U.S. trade partners 
that final agreements will be given timely and unamended consideration. On July 30, 2013, 
President Obama requested that Congress reauthorize TPA. On January 9, 2014, legislation to 
renew TPA—the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014—was introduced in the 
House (H.R. 3830) and in the Senate (S. 1900). The legislation would reauthorize TPA for four 
years with the possibility of a three-year extension. Alternative bills may also be introduced. 
TPA reflects decades of debate, cooperation, and compromise between Congress and the 
executive branch in finding a pragmatic accommodation to the exercise of each branch’s 
respective authorities over trade policy. The expedited legislative procedures have not changed 
since first codified in the Trade Act of 1974. Congress, however, has required that the authority to 
use TPA be periodically reauthorized, and at times has chosen to revise trade negotiation 
objectives, the consultative mechanism, and presidential notification requirements. While early 
versions of fast track/TPA received bipartisan support, later renewal efforts have been more 
controversial, culminating in a more partisan vote on the 2002 TPA renewal. Future debates on 
TPA renewal may center on trade negotiation objectives, congressional oversight of trade 
negotiations, trade agreement enforcement, and clarifying the congressional authority over 
approval of reciprocal trade agreements and trade policy more generally, among others. 
TPA renewal has become a more pressing issue in the 113th Congress because current trade 
negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) and the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) are in progress. Technically, TPA 
is not necessary to begin or even conclude trade negotiations, but it is widely understood to be a 
key element of defining congressional authority, and of passing trade agreement implementing 
legislation. Therefore, its renewal can be construed as signaling serious congressional support for 
moving ahead with trade negotiations. Addressing congressional concerns over the definition and 
operation of TPA may be a central part of the debate. 
Although there appears to be support for renewal of TPA in Congress, the details of the legislation 
are likely to be subject to considerable debate, including the specific treatment of any related 
TAA program reauthorization. This report presents background and analysis on the development 
of TPA, a summary of the major provisions under the expired authority, and a discussion of the 
issues that have arisen in the debate over TPA renewal. It also explores some of the policy options 
available to Congress. 
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n July 1, 2007, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA—previously known as fast track) 
expired. TPA is the authority that Congress grants to the President to enter into certain 
reciprocal trade agreements, and to have the requisite implementing legislation 
considered under expedited legislative procedures. Although the President has the authority under 
the Constitution to negotiate international agreements, typically a reciprocal trade agreement 
requires an implementing bill and, therefore, congressional action to bring it into force. Many 
Members of Congress have advocated for renewal of TPA .On July 30, 2013, President Obama 
requested that Congress reauthorize TPA. On January 9, 2014, legislation to renew TPA—the 
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act of 2014—was introduced in the House (H.R. 3830) 
and in the Senate (S. 1900). The legislation would reauthorize TPA for four years with the 
possibility of a three-year extension. Alternative bills may also be introduced during the second 
session of the 113th Congress. 
Although there appears to be support for renewal of TPA in Congress, the details of the legislation 
are likely to be subject to considerable debate, including the specific treatment of any related 
TAA program reauthorization.1 This report presents background and analysis on the development 
of TPA, a summary of the major provisions under the expired authority, and a discussion of the 
issues that have arisen in the debate over TPA renewal. It also explores some of the policy options 
available to Congress. 
Introduction 
The 112th Congress exercised TPA authority and procedures in passing implementing bills for 
U.S. bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea on October 
12, 2011, concluding action on the last three FTAs signed prior to the expiration of TPA in 2007. 
Four other trade negotiations in progress that could result in agreements that would likely require 
TPA to pass implementing legislation include: 1) the multilateral Doha Development Round of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO); 2) the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); 3) the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP); and 4) the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA). 
For more than 30 years, Congress has granted the President TPA/fast track authority, agreeing to 
consider trade agreement implementing legislation expeditiously and to vote on it without 
amendment, provided the President meets certain statutory negotiating objectives and 
consultation requirements, and the implementing bill contains the necessary and limited 
qualifying provisions. TPA strikes a delicate balance by clarifying how Congress chooses to 
exercise its constitutional authority over a particular aspect of trade policy, while presumably 
giving the President additional negotiating leverage by effectively assuring U.S. trade partners 
that a final agreement will be given timely and unamended consideration by Congress.2 
Earlier incarnations of TPA, although controversial, were adopted with substantial bipartisan 
majorities. Over time, however, trade negotiations have become more complex. Congress also has 
insisted on tighter oversight and consultation requirements, and the trade debate has become more 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of TAA and trade policy, see CRS Report R41922, Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) and Its Role 
in U.S. Trade Policy, by J. F. Hornbeck 
2 Such a presumption may be questioned given that the three FTAs approved in 2011 languished for over three years 
without congressional action. 
O
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partisan in nature, making congressional renewal of TPA more controversial. The expiration of 
TPA raises the central questions of whether, when, and in what form TPA renewal might take. 
A Brief History of TPA 
TPA is the product of many decades of debate, cooperation, and compromise between Congress 
and the executive branch. At its foundation lie the respective constitutional powers granted to 
Congress and the President, as well as the pragmatic realization that a certain cooperative 
flexibility is needed if the United States is to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements credibly. The 
evolution of TPA to date shows, among other things, that the congressional-executive partnership 
on trade policymaking can be strengthened or strained as it adjusts to evolving political and 
economic conditions, as well as shifting priorities of the two branches. 
The U.S. Constitution and Foreign Trade 
The U.S. Constitution assigns express authority over the regulation of foreign trade to Congress. 
Article I, Section 8, gives Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations ... ” 
and to “ ... lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.... ” In contrast, the Constitution 
assigns no specific responsibility for trade to the President.3 Under Article II, however, the 
President has exclusive authority to negotiate treaties and international agreements and exercises 
broad authority over the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs. Both legislative and executive 
authorities come into play in the development and execution of U.S. trade agreements. 
The Evolution of the Congressional-Executive Partnership 
For roughly the first 150 years of the United States, Congress exercised its authority over foreign 
trade by setting tariff rates on all imported products. The tariff was the main trade policy 
instrument and primary source of federal revenue. Early congressional trade debates pitted 
Members from northern manufacturing regions, who benefitted from protectionist tariffs, against 
those from largely southern commodity exporting regions, who advocated low tariffs. During this 
period, the President’s primary role in setting trade policy was to use his foreign affairs authority 
to negotiate, bring into force, and implement (with the advice and consent of the Senate) general 
bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. These treaties “included a U.S. 
commitment to most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment” or non-discrimination in the application of 
tariffs for all treaty partners.4 
Two legislative events occurred in the 1930s that radically changed the shape and conduct of U.S. 
trade policy. The first was the “Smoot-Hawley” Tariff Act of 1930 (P.L. 71-361), which set 
prohibitively high tariff rates in response to U.S. producers seeking protection at the outset of the 
Great Depression. The act led to retaliatory tariffs by major U.S. trade partners, which severely 
restricted trade and contributed to the deep and prolonged effects of the depression. 
                                                 
3 I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2005), p. 14. 
4 Hal Shapiro and Lael Brainard, “Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast Track: Building Common 
Ground on Trade Demands More Than a Name Change,” The George Washington International Law Review, vol. 35, 
no. 1 (2003), p. 6. MFN, also known in U.S. law as normal trade relations (NTR) status, means that the United States 
would treat the imports from that trading partner no less favorably than the imports from other trading partners. 
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy 
 
Congressional Research Service 3 
The damaging effects of Smoot-Hawley prompted the second major trade legislative event in the 
1930s. Congress, with the guidance and encouragement of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 
himself a former Senator, developed and enacted the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 
(RTAA; P.L. 73-316). The RTAA authorized the President to enter into reciprocal trade 
agreements that reduced tariffs within pre-approved levels. The tariffs were applied on an MFN 
basis. Under the RTAA, Congress authorized the President to implement the new tariffs by 
proclamation without additional legislation. The RTAA is important for several reasons: 
• For the first time, Congress expressly delegated to the President an expanded 
trade agreements authority to reduce tariffs within congressionally predefined 
ranges. In so doing, some argued, Congress aimed to lessen the political pressure 
from special interests it often faced.5 
• The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act was the last general tariff legislation passed by 
Congress. While still on the books, the Smoot-Hawley tariffs are now only 
applied to imports from those few countries, namely Cuba and North Korea, not 
receiving MFN status, now referred to as normal trade relations status (NTR) in 
U.S. trade laws. 
• While delegating tariff-cutting authority, Congress did not surrender broader 
trade authority and insured legislatively against executive branch overreach by 
subjecting the trade agreements authority to a limited time period, making such 
authority subject to periodic review and renewal.6 
Congress renewed presidential reciprocal trade agreements authority for tariff reductions 11 times 
until 1962 through trade agreement extension acts (see Appendix A). General tariff levels 
declined and their significance as a trade barrier diminished.7 In addition, with the establishment 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, the major forum for trade 
negotiations shifted from bilateral to multilateral negotiations, and trade negotiations were 
eventually expanded beyond tariffs.8 
Under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress granted the President authority for five years 
to enter into agreements that negotiated the reduction or elimination of tariffs. The act also 
expanded Congress’s role in the negotiating process by requiring the President to submit for 
congressional review a copy of each concluded agreement and a presidential statement explaining 
why the agreement was necessary. It allowed the President to conclude the GATT Kennedy 
Round (1963-1967), the last round in which tariff reduction was the primary focus of trade 
negotiations. 
Along with a number of tariff reduction agreements, which were covered by the congressional 
trade agreements authority, the GATT member countries reached agreements in the Kennedy 
                                                 
5 Destler, American Trade Politics, pp. 14-15, and Robert A. Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign 
Economic Policy 1929-1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 79-80 and 92. 
6 The original bill sent to Congress by the Roosevelt Administration had no time limit on the delegated authority, which 
was amended on the House floor to include a three-year authorization. Ibid., pp. 87, 89, and 92. 
7 Shapiro and Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast Track, p. 11. 
8 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) went into effect in 1947 as a set of rules governing 
international trade. Over time, the number of GATT signatories grew and the body of rules was expanded in a series of 
negotiations called rounds. During the Uruguay Round, the signatories agreed to establish the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), now 155 members, to administer the GATT and other multilateral trade agreements. 
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Round in two areas related to nontariff barriers (NTBs), that is, laws and rules other than tariffs 
that are used to restrict imports. The first was a customs valuation agreement that would have 
required the United States to eliminate the American Selling Price method of pricing goods at the 
border. The second was an antidumping agreement that would have required changes in U.S. 
antidumping practices.9 Because U.S. adherence to these agreements would have required 
changes in U.S. law or regulations beyond tariff modifications, many in Congress concluded that 
the President had exceeded the authority delegated to him. In fact, Congress passed a resolution 
in 1966 instructing the Johnson Administration against negotiating “nontariff commitments.” 
When he ignored it, Congress declined to implement the NTB changes, setting up the debate that 
would eventually be resolved with the creation of the fast track authority for trade agreements.10 
Creation of “Fast Track Trade Negotiating Authority” 
The results of the Kennedy Round made evident, that changes in nontariff barrier rules would 
increasingly dominate the agenda of future multilateral trade agreements, which would also 
require changes in U.S. law if the United States were to adhere to them. Concern over presidential 
encroachment on its legislative authority prompted Congress to seek a legislative remedy. 
The tariff modification authority in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 expired on July 1, 1967, but 
Congress did not renew the authority for seven years as it debated legislative options. The Nixon 
Administration sought new authority to negotiate the Tokyo Round in the GATT, which Congress 
granted in the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618). As before, the act provided the President with the 
authority to enter into trade agreements that reduced or eliminated tariffs within certain 
predefined parameters. To address the critical issue of agreements that required changes in U.S. 
law beyond tariff modifications, the act stipulated that nontariff barrier agreements entered into 
under this statute could only enter into force if Congress passed implementing legislation. 
Some in Congress, however, argued that subjecting implementing legislation to ordinary 
congressional debate and amendment procedures would defeat a major purpose for delegating 
trade agreements authority to the President in the first place—to reduce the special interest 
pressures inherent in trade policymaking. Many Members also recognized an important potential 
problem: that U.S. trading partners would be reluctant to negotiate agreements that would be 
subject to unlimited congressional debate and amendment. As stated in the Senate Finance 
Committee report accompanying the Trade Act of 1974: 
The Committee recognizes ... that such agreements negotiated by the Executive should be 
given an up-or-down vote by the Congress. Our negotiators cannot be expected to 
accomplish the negotiating goals ... if there are no reasonable assurances that the negotiated 
agreements would be voted up-or-down on their merits. Our trading partners have expressed 
an unwillingness to negotiate without some assurances that the Congress will consider the 
agreements within a definite time-frame.11 
                                                 
9 I. M. Destler, Renewing Fast-Track Legislation (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997), p. 6. 
10 Destler, American Trade Politics, pp. 71-72 and Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy 
1929-1976, pp. 120-121. 
11 U.S. Congress; Senate; Committee on Finance; Trade Reform Act of 1974; Report ... on H.R. 10710 (S.Rept. 93-
1298), November 26, 1974, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974. p. 107. The rationale may be traced to the RTAA of 1934. See 
Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy 1929-1976, pp. 88-89. 
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As a solution, Congress agreed that each chamber would suspend its ordinary legislative 
procedures and give trade agreements expedited treatment. The relevant committees would be 
given limited time to consider implementing bills. Once they reached the floor, the implementing 
bills would be subject to time-limited debate and no amendments. In exchange, Congress required 
the executive branch to consult with relevant committees during the negotiations and to notify 
Congress 90 calendar days before signing an agreement. The act also provided for the 
accreditation of 10 Members of Congress as advisers to the U.S. delegation of negotiators. (The 
Trade Act of 1962 had provided for five such advisers.) These provisions rounded out what would 
become commonly known as “fast track trade negotiating authority.”12 
With the trade “negotiating” authority and the “fast track” provisions of the Trade Act of 1974, 
the United States concluded the Tokyo Round of the GATT (1973-1979). As expected, this round 
resulted in a number of agreements on NTBs, such as government procurement practices, product 
standards, customs regulations, and rules for administering antidumping and countervailing duty 
procedures. The resulting Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-39) was the first trade 
implementing bill passed by Congress under the expanded trade agreements authority and 
expedited procedures. 
Subsequent Renewals of Trade Agreements Authority 
The expedited legislative procedures have not changed since first enacted in 1974. These 
provisions are ensconced in Sections 151-154 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, and are not 
subject to sunset provisions. The ability to use them, however, is subject to time limits, and 
Congress has revised them over the years. (The next section of this report examines these 
procedures and trade agreements authority in more detail.) The initial grant of “fast track trade 
negotiating authority” and the authority to enact tariff modifications by proclamation under the 
Trade Act of 1974 were in effect for five years ending on January 2, 1980. Congress extended a 
residual presidential authority to proclaim tariff modifications to January 2, 1982. 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
Along with implementing the Tokyo Round agreements, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 
extended for eight years, until January 2, 1988, the presidential authority to enter into agreements 
on nontariff barriers, but made no other changes to the original authority. The act did not extend 
presidential tariff modification authority. 
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 
This act amended the Trade Act of 1974 by adding trade agreements authority that provided for 
the “negotiation” and implementation of bilateral free trade agreements that both reduced or 
eliminated tariffs and addressed nontariff barriers. Congress was taking into account the U.S.-
Israel and U.S.-Canada FTAs that were under consideration. The legislation waived for the U.S.-
Israel FTA the requirement of a 90-day notification to Congress prior to entering the agreement. 
                                                 
12 This terminology, although widely used, is imprecise. First, the President has standing constitutional authority to 
negotiate international agreements, so trade agreements authority in statute refers strictly to the authority Congress 
conveys to the President to “enter into” reciprocal trade agreements, not negotiate them. Second, the term “fast track” 
became common usage to reference the new expedited legislative procedures, but was not a term used in the act. 
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However, for negotiations with other countries, it required the President to notify the House Ways 
and Means and Senate Finance Committees of his intention to begin FTA negotiations 60 days 
prior to entering the negotiations and provided for denial of expedited procedures if either 
committee disapproved of the negotiation within 60 days after receiving the notification. The act 
also required that agreements that led to tariff modifications beyond a certain threshold be subject 
to congressional approval via implementing legislation. 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA) 
The OTCA, an extensive trade bill that addressed numerous areas of trade policy, extended the 
President’s authority to enter into trade agreements before June 1, 1993, but extended the 
application of expedited procedures only for agreements entered into before June 1, 1991. 
Legislation for agreements entered into after that date, but before June 1, 1993, could be approved 
under the expedited procedures, if the President requested an extension of such authority and it 
was not disapproved by either the House or the Senate. (The President requested the extension, 
which survived proposed House and Senate resolutions of disapproval.) The OTCA also provided 
that Congress could withhold a trade agreement from fast track consideration by passing a 
resolution of disapproval, if it determined that the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
had failed to consult with Congress adequately during the trade negotiations. Under the OTCA 
provisions, Congress greatly expanded the trade negotiation objectives and passed implementing 
legislation for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 (P.L. 103-182). 
Multilateral negotiations under the Uruguay Round of the GATT, however, did not conclude in 
time to meet the June 1, 1993, expiration deadline. In response, Congress passed H.R. 1876, 
signed by the President on July 2, 1993 (P.L. 103-49), extending the authority and implementing 
procedures until April 16, 1994, solely for the Uruguay Round. The votes reflected strong 
congressional support in the House (295-126) and in the Senate (76-16). The law did not change 
any other aspects of the fast track authority. 
A Hiatus 
After the trade agreements authority expired on April 16, 1994, Congress did not approve new 
authority until the Trade Act of 2002 (H.R. 3009; P.L. 107-210). The eight-year period was the 
longest hiatus since fast track was initially approved in 1974. In 1997, both the Senate Finance 
and the House Ways and Means Committees reported out legislation to renew fast track. House 
Republican leaders pulled it before a floor vote at the request of the Clinton Administration 
because it lacked sufficient support in the House. In September 1998, the House voted on fast 
track authority legislation, but the bill failed to pass (180-243). 
Several reasons may explain Congress’s decision not to enact new trade agreements authority for 
the Clinton Administration. For one, although both the Republican congressional leadership and 
the Clinton Administration supported fast track authority, the two sides could not agree on the 
negotiating objectives for labor and environmental issues under the proposed renewed authority. 
In general, Republicans wanted more limited coverage than the Clinton Administration and many 
Democrats in Congress preferred. In addition, the WTO (successor to the GATT) failed to launch 
a new round of negotiations at the 1999 WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, and therefore, no 
major trade negotiations were underway that might have made renewal of trade agreements 
authority a political priority. 
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The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act (BTPAA) of 2002 
In 2001, President George W. Bush requested a renewal of fast track authority. It was renamed in 
the legislation “trade promotion authority (TPA),” in part to counter what many viewed as a 
negative connotation associated with the term fast track. The renewed authority is contained in 
the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act (BTPAA) of 2002, which was enacted as Title XXI 
of The Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). 
The structure of TPA was consistent with previous trade agreements authority. It included new 
language for labor and environmental provisions, defining them as “principal negotiating 
objectives.” TPA did not mandate the inclusion of minimal enforceable labor standards in trade 
agreements,13 one reason labor groups and many Members of Congress opposed it. The act also 
created a new mechanism for congressional consultation, the Congressional Oversight Group 
(COG), to operate in addition to the congressional trade advisors that were appointed under 
previous versions. (A more detailed discussion of the notification and consultation requirements 
appears in the next section.) 
The original House version of the BTPAA (H.R. 3005) passed by one vote (215-214), largely 
along party lines, with Republicans mostly supporting the bill and Democrats largely opposing it. 
The legislation was combined in the Senate with renewal of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), 
the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). It 
passed 66 to 30. The conference report on the final bill, H.R. 3009, the Trade Act of 2002, was 
adopted by the House (215-212) and Senate (64-34).14 
Under the 2002 version of TPA, Congress approved implementing legislation for FTAs with 
Chile, Singapore, Australia, Morocco, the Dominican Republic, the Central American countries, 
Bahrain, Oman, Peru, Colombia, Panama, and South Korea. The United States was also interested 
in FTA negotiations with Malaysia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and the members of the 
South African Customs Union (SACU), which are currently suspended and would have to be 
taken up under some future TPA authority for legislation to be considered under expedited 
procedures. 
The United States and more than 150 other members of the WTO are also engaged in the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), a protracted round of multilateral negotiations to liberalize trade 
and revise and expand rules for conducting trade in agriculture, manufactured goods, and 
services, with an emphasis on meeting the needs of developing countries.15 In addition, 
negotiations on the TPP agreement may become a compelling reason to reconsider the need for 
TPA.16 Although many argue that TPA is necessary for the U.S. bargaining position to remain 
credible, others note that technically TPA is not required to complete the negotiations (as the 
example of the Uruguay Round discussed above suggests). Should a breakthrough be made on an 
                                                 
13 Charan Devereaux, Robert Z. Lawrence, and Michael D. Watkins, Case Studies in U.S. Trade Negotiation, Volume I: 
Making the Rules (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2006), p. 229. 
14 For details on votes on this legislation, see CRS Report RS21004, Trade Promotion Authority and Fast-Track 
Negotiating Authority for Trade Agreements: Major Votes, by Carolyn C. Smith. 
15 For details, see CRS Report RL32060, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda, by 
Ian F. Fergusson. 
16 See CRS Report R42344, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Countries: Comparative Trade and Economic Analysis, 
by Brock R. Williams. 
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agreement that the U.S. Congress would approve, Congress could extend TPA exclusively for the 
TPP or the Doha Round. 
The Elements of TPA 
Through TPA/fast track, in its various iterations, Congress has sought to achieve four major goals 
in the context of supporting trade negotiations: (1) to define trade policy priorities and to have 
those priorities reflected in trade agreement negotiating objectives; (2) to ensure that the 
executive branch adheres to these objectives by requiring periodic notification and consultation 
with Congress; (3) to define the terms, conditions, and procedures under which the President may 
enter into trade agreements and under which the respective implementing bills may be approved; 
and (4) to reaffirm Congress’s overall constitutional authority over trade by placing limitations on 
the trade agreements authority. These four goals, and some important procedural precedents that 
fall outside the formal legal TPA process, are examined below. 
Trade Agreements Authority 
As discussed above, when the statutory authority to enter into trade agreements was limited to 
reducing tariffs, the trade agreement was implemented by presidential proclamation and without 
further congressional action, provided the tariff rate reductions were within legislatively pre-
approved limits. This process changed when trade negotiations were expanded to include 
nontariff barriers (NTBs). These more complex agreements requiring changes to domestic law led 
Congress to tighten its control over trade agreements negotiation and implementation by 
establishing “fast track trade negotiating authority.” As set out in the Trade Act of 1974, NTB 
agreements could enter into force for the United States only with passage of implementing 
legislation.17 
At the heart of what is now called TPA are the expedited procedures for moving trade 
implementing legislation through Congress (Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974—see below), 
which have been used for nearly all reciprocal trade agreements.18 Under Section 2103 of the 
Trade Act of 2002, Trade Agreements Authority, Congress makes these expedited procedures 
available only for a qualifying bill, which is referred to as a trade implementing bill. The bill 
qualifies only if certain conditions are met. First, the trade agreement entered into must make 
progress in meeting TPA’s negotiating objectives, and the President must satisfy the notification 
and consultation requirements of the TPA statute (see below). Second, the implementing bill must 
contain provisions that approve the agreement and the statement of administrative action, and 
                                                 
17 Under TPA, reciprocal FTAs and multilateral trade agreements that go beyond tariff reductions are treated as 
congressional-executive agreements, which require the approval of both houses of Congress. Such approval expresses 
Congress’s consent to bind the United States to the commitments of the agreement under international law. This type of 
agreement is distinguished from both an executive agreement, requiring only presidential action, and a treaty, requiring 
a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Because reciprocal trade agreements typically result in tariff rate (revenue) changes, the 
House of Representatives is necessarily involved. For a more detailed legal discussion, see CRS Report 97-896, Why 
Certain Trade Agreements Are Approved as Congressional-Executive Agreements Rather Than Treaties, by Jane M. 
Smith, Daniel T. Shedd, and Brandon J. Murrill, and Hal S. Shapiro, Fast Track: A Legal, Historical, and Political 
Analysis (Ardsley: Transnational Publishers, 2006), p. 22. 
18 The U.S.-Jordan FTA is the exception. 
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contain only those other provisions changing laws “necessary or appropriate” to implement the 
agreement (“either repealing or amending existing laws or providing new statutory authority”).19 
Importantly, Congress has been explicit that the expedited procedures “are enacted as an exercise 
of the rulemaking power of the House and the Senate, with the recognition of the right of either 
House to change the rules at any time.”20 This provision is one, of many, that conveys a 
congressional priority in controlling the approval and implementation of trade agreements. 
Implementation of Trade Agreements 
In a trade implementing bill, Congress conveys to the President the authority to provide for the 
agreement to enter into force by presidential proclamation, after determining that the partner 
country(ies) has taken measures necessary to comply with the provisions of the agreement. The 
requirements of this authority are defined in Section 2105 of the Trade Act of 2002 (see 
Appendix B for TPA timeline) under which an agreement may enter into force “if and only if”: 
(1) at least 90 calendar days prior to signing the agreement, the President notifies Congress of his 
intention to do so (to provide opportunity for congressional review and possibly provide input 
before the agreement is signed, at which point it ostensibly can no longer be changed);21 
(2) within 60 calendar days of signing the agreement, the President provides Congress with a list 
of required changes to U.S. law needed to bring the United States into compliance with the 
agreement; 
(3) after entering into the agreement, on a day in which both houses of Congress are in session, 
the President transmits a copy of the final legal text of the trade agreement, a draft implementing 
bill, a statement of administrative action proposed to implement the agreement, and supporting 
statements on how the agreement meets various congressional priorities and objectives, changes 
existing agreements, and serves the purpose of U.S. commercial interests, and on how the 
implementing bill meets the statute’s requirements for being an implementing bill (see section 
above); and 
(4) the implementing bill is enacted into law. 
                                                 
19 These conditions are reinforced in the U.S. Congress, Committee on Conference, Trade Act of 2002, Conference 
Report to accompany H.R. 3009, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., July 26, 2002, H.Rept. 107-624 (Washington: GPO, 2002), p. 
161. 
20 In addition to the statute, this rule is reinforced in the conference report, ibid., pp. 166-167. Indeed, the House did 
change the rules on April 10, 2008, when it approved H.Res. 1092 (224-195). That measure stated that Sections 
151(e)(1) and Section 151(f)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 would not apply to H.R. 5724, the implementing legislation 
for the U.S.-Colombia FTA. Section 151 establishes the expedited (fast track) procedures. Section 151(e)(1) establishes 
the time limits for committee and floor consideration of the implementing bill. Section 151(f)(1) establishes the 
procedures for consideration of a motion in the House for consideration of the implementing bill. Other elements of the 
expedited procedures, for example, the prohibition on amendments to the implementing bill (Section 151 (d)) would 
still have applied to H.R. 5724. Also, H.Res. 1092 only applied to the U.S.-Colombia FTA. 
21 In fact, Congress has been able to press for changes in FTAs after they were signed, the U.S.-Peru and U.S.-South 
Korea FTAs being cases in point, perhaps another issue to be considered in a future TPA renewal debate. 
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Expedited Legislative Procedures 
Should the above requirements be fulfilled to the satisfaction of Congress, it has agreed to follow 
certain expedited legislative procedures as defined in Sections 151-154 of the Trade Act of 1974, 
as amended. In effect, these rules require that Congress must act on the bill sent over by the White 
House, and in other ways represent a significant departure from ordinary legislative procedures. 
The major rules are listed below (see Appendix C for greater detail): 
(1) mandatory introduction of the implementing bill in both houses of Congress and immediate 
referral to the appropriate committees (House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, and others);22 
(2) automatic discharge from House and Senate Committees after a limited period of time; 
(3) limited floor debate; and 
(4) no amendment, meaning that each House must vote either up or down on the bill, which 
passes with a simple majority. 
Negotiating Objectives 
Congress exercises its trade policy role, in part, by defining trade negotiation objectives in TPA 
legislation. In the 2002 TPA, Congress made clear that trade is an important aspect of U.S. 
foreign economic and security policy because it generates broad benefits for the United States and 
the global economy. To take the fullest advantage of these benefits, Congress, drawing on its 
constitutional authority and historical precedent, defined the objectives that the President is to 
pursue in trade negotiations. Although the executive branch has some discretion over 
implementing these goals, they are definitive statements of U.S. trade policy that the 
Administration is expected to honor, if it expects trade agreement implementing legislation to be 
considered under expedited rules. For this reason, trade negotiating objectives stand at the center 
of the congressional debate on TPA.23 
Congress establishes trade negotiating objectives in three categories: (1) overall objectives; (2) 
principal objectives; and (3) other priorities. These begin with broad goals that encapsulate the 
“overall” direction trade negotiations are expected to take, such as enhancing U.S. and global 
economies. Principal objectives are more specific and provide detailed goals that Congress 
expects to be integrated into trade agreements, such as reducing barriers and distortions to trade 
(e.g., goods, services, agriculture); protecting foreign investment and intellectual property rights; 
encouraging transparency; establishing fair regulatory practices; combating anti-corruption; 
ensuring that countries enforce their environmental and labor laws; providing for an effective 
dispute settlement process; and protecting the U.S. right to enforce its trade remedy laws. 
Objectives also include an important obligation to consult Congress, discussed in detail below. 
In the past, language defining trade negotiating objectives has been contested, contributing to the 
2002 renewal controversy in which TPA passed largely along partisan lines and by the narrowest 
                                                 
22 Additional referrals depend on whether there are provisions in the agreement that require changes in law under the 
jurisdiction of other committees. 
23 Detailed language may be found in P.L. 107-210, section 2102; 116 STAT. 994. 
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of margins in the House. This controversy reflects the importance that TPA negotiating objectives 
can play as a template for future trade agreements negotiated under these guidelines. For 
example, if the language of a TPA objective is highly contentious, the same issue may prove 
controversial when a specific trade agreement is brought before Congress for approval using that 
same or similar language. The labor provisions, which are emphasized in all three groups of 
negotiating objectives, provide the best illustration. In particular, the decision not to include 
minimal enforceable standards in TPA led to contentious debate over both TPA and the FTAs that 
later adopted the TPA language on labor. This issue was perhaps most evident in the 2005 debate 
on passage of the implementing bill for the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States 
Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). 
Because the structure of trade agreements mirrors TPA objectives, and disputes over FTAs based 
on those objectives brought before Congress under TPA have so far survived all challenges from 
opponents, the vote on renewing TPA/fast track authority is among the most critical trade votes 
Congress considers.  
Notification and Consultation 
The trade agreements authority is extended to the President provided he or his designee consults 
regularly with Congress. This requirement includes the Congressional Oversight Group (COG), 
created in the Trade Act of 2002, whose members are accredited as official advisors to the trade 
negotiation delegations. Notification and consultation requirements have been revised in each 
renewal of authority. Most of these requirements are found in Section 2104 of the BTPAA statute. 
The timing of these notifications is detailed in the time line presented in Appendix B. First, the 
President must conduct certain notifications and consultations before negotiations begin that 
include 
(1) notifying Congress in writing of his intention to enter into negotiations at least 90 calendar 
days prior to commencing negotiations; 
(2) consulting with the House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, other relevant committees, and 
the COG on the nature of the negotiations; and 
(3) providing special consultations on agriculture, import sensitive agricultural products, fishing 
and textile industries tariffs, and other issues. 
The President must also conduct specific notifications and consultations before (and after) 
agreements are entered into (signed), to include 
(1) notifying Congress in writing of his intention to enter into an agreement at least 90 calendar 
days prior to doing so; 
(2) consulting with House Ways and Means, Senate Finance, other relevant committees, and the 
COG with respect to the nature of the agreement, how it achieves the purposes defined in TPA, 
and any potential effects it may have on existing laws; 
(3) notifying the revenue committees at least 180 calendar days prior to entering into the 
agreement of any potential changes to U.S. trade remedy laws that may be required; 
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(4) submitting private sector advisory committee reports to Congress, the President, and the 
USTR no later than 30 calendar days after notifying Congress of his intention to enter into an 
agreement;24 
(5) providing the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) with trade agreement details at 
least 90 days before entering into an agreement; and 
(6) presenting to Congress no later than 90 calendar days after the President enters into the 
agreement, the USITC report on the impact of the agreement on the U.S. economy. 
The congressional consultation process is a long-standing precedent and an integral part of TPA. 
It reflects Congress’s ongoing interest in ensuring that trade policy remains under the purview of 
the legislative branch by establishing in law opportunities to affect the nature and direction of 
trade negotiations. The effectiveness of the consultation process, however, has been questioned. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) evaluated this process based on multiple 
interviews with current and former congressional staff and executive branch employees. It found 
that from 2002 to 2007, the USTR had conducted “extensive” consultations with Members and 
staff of Congress on all FTAs that were to be presented to Congress for approval under TPA.25 
According to GAO’s findings, however, many congressional staff indicated that despite the high 
quality of information and frequency of meetings with USTR officials, they often did not allow 
for sufficient time to provide input into the negotiation process, were often cast more as briefings 
than consultations (implying an exchange of views), and did not always include last minute 
changes to draft FTA texts. In short, staff expressed concern that the consultation process did not 
satisfy many in Congress and may need to be amended to allow for greater and earlier 
congressional input into the drafting of FTAs.26 Similar concerns have been raised in the 112th 
Congress over the TPP negotiations. 
Limiting Trade Agreements Authority 
Congress adopted TPA procedures on pragmatic grounds as self-limiting conditions to prevent 
trade implementing bills from being delayed or obstructed by congressional procedures that can 
either keep a bill from moving out of committee, or delay it on the floor of the House or Senate 
with extended debate. Trade agreements can also be the product of a fragile consensus between 
trade partners, and TPA procedures were designed to protect such a consensus from congressional 
amendments that would change the basic agreement. In crafting TPA, however, Congress did not 
agree to surrender its constitutional authority over trade matters and wrote into TPA a number of 
provisions that can limit the use of the expedited procedures. 
                                                 
24 The private sector advisory system was established by Congress in 1974 to ensure that U.S. trade policy and 
negotiations benefit from, and reflect, a broad array of private sector U.S. interests. It consists of 28 committees and 
over 700 advisors, coordinated by the Office of the United States Trade Representative. The USTR also chairs the 
interagency trade coordinating structure to coordinate U.S. government positions on international trade issues. Office of 
the United States Trade Representative, 2012 Trade Policy Agenda and 2011 Annual Report of the President of the 
United States on the Trade Agreements Program, Washington, D.C., March 2012, p. 203. 
25 United States Government Accountability Office Report to the Chairman; Committee on Finance; International 
Trade: An Analysis of Free Trade Agreements and Congressional and Private Sector Consultations under Trade 
Promotion Authority; GAO-08-59; November 2007, pp. 29 and 41-42. 
26 Ibid., pp. 29 and 43-46. 
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Sunset Provision 
Each renewal of the trade agreements authority has provided the use of expedited procedures for 
trade agreement implementing bills for a limited time, a way to ensure congressional oversight 
over their use. The 2002 statute made these procedures available for trade agreements entered into 
before July 1, 2007. Importantly, however, as with previous versions, the act provided no deadline 
for submitting implementing legislation for an FTA that is entered into before the expiration of 
the authority. For example, the FTA with Colombia was signed in November 2006 (the 109th 
Congress) and FTAs with Panama and South Korea were signed in June 2007 (110th Congress), 
but implementing bills were not passed until October 12, 2011 (112th Congress). 
Extension Disapproval 
The TPA legislation has required that the President request an extension of the TPA authority after 
a certain period of time. The extension was granted unless either House of Congress adopted a 
disapproval resolution. Such a resolution of disapproval may not be considered unless it is 
reported out of either the House Ways and Means or Senate Finance Committees. Although such 
resolutions have been reported out of committee in the past, none has been passed in either House 
of Congress. This process is a reminder to the executive branch that the availability of expedited 
legislative procedures is a congressional prerogative that can be denied if Congress becomes 
dissatisfied with how the President has conducted trade agreement negotiations. 
Procedural Disapproval 
The requirement that the President fulfill consultation and reporting obligations also helps 
preserve the congressional role on trade agreements by giving Congress the opportunity to 
influence the agreement before it is finalized. Should Congress determine that the President has 
failed to meet these requirements, it may decide that the implementing bill is not eligible to be 
considered under TPA rules. It would implement this decision by adopting a joint “procedural 
disapproval” resolution in both houses of Congress. 
Withdrawal of Expedited Procedures 
The Trade Act of 1974, as amended, provides that the expedited procedures for consideration of 
trade implementing bills are enacted as rules of procedures for each House, “with the full 
recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the 
procedure of that House) at any time.”27 Congress reserves its constitutional right to withdraw or 
override the expedited procedures for trade implementing bills, which can take effect with a vote 
by either House of Congress.28 
This summary suggests that in addition to binding rules, the long-term success of TPA rests on a 
facilitating cooperation and partnership between the legislative and executive branches of 
government,29 and by extension, between the two major political parties. Some have noted that 
                                                 
27 Section 151(a)(2) of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618). 
28 See Shapiro, Fast Track: A Legal, Historical, and Political Analysis, p. 28. 
29 Michael A. Carrier, “All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to Beyond,” The George Washington 
Journal of International Law and Economics, vol. 29 (1996), p. 735. 
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the sense of such cooperation was absent under the previous TPA, placing a strain on the trade 
legislative process in recent years. One could argue that a bipartisan agreement on TPA has been 
absent since at least 1993, as evident in the eight-year lapse during the Clinton Administration 
and the largely partisan passage of the 2002 TPA renewal.  
Congressional Procedures Outside TPA 
In addition to the expedited procedures defined in TPA, Congress, generally with the effective 
support and consent of the executive branch, has followed certain procedures during the 
consideration of trade agreement implementing bills that, although not formally defined in TPA, 
have been integrated into the process of congressional approval of trade agreements. Three in 
particular stand out: 
Hearings and “Mock Markups” 
Congress has insisted on reviewing a trade agreement prior to the implementing bill being 
introduced. This is done first in hearings before the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance 
Committees, as well as possibly other interested committees. The Ways and Means and Finance 
Committees typically follow with an “unofficial” or “informal” markup session, which may be 
followed by a “mock conference” of an informal draft version of the implementing bill, which is 
sent over by the White House, along with a draft of the final text of the trade agreement. 
The informal markup is, in effect, a test run of congressional response to the trade agreement 
implementing bill. Because it is only an informal draft bill, there is no real legislation to “mark 
up,” but the meetings afford committee members an opportunity to raise concerns on the draft 
trade agreement, as well as the informal draft implementing legislation, and offer amendments 
that may serve as important signals to the Administration of changes to the actual implementing 
bill they would like to see made. The two revenue committees may use the “mock conference” to 
reconcile any differences in their informal markups to reinforce congressional positions.30 
Although a trade agreement at this point has already been concluded, a clarification or 
“translation” of key points that do not alter the basic agreement can and may be made in the final 
implementing bill.31 The Administration, however, can exercise discretion in accepting suggested 
changes from Congress. For example, while the committees offered many changes to the 
CAFTA-DR agreement that the Bush Administration tried to accommodate, the same 
Administration declined to include the language of an amendment unanimously supported by the 
Senate Finance Committee with respect to the U.S.-Oman FTA implementing legislation, citing 
TPA’s own requirement that only legislation “necessary or appropriate” to implement the 
agreement be included. The Oman FTA implementing bill passed, but a new bipartisan call for 
better consultation prior to the President entering into a trade agreement arose because of 
dissatisfaction with both the Oman FTA and the TPA process.32 
                                                 
30 Congressional intent to influence the implementing bill is conveyed in U.S. Congress, Committee on Conference, 
Trade Act of 2002, Conference Report to accompany H.R. 3009, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., July 26, 2002, Report 107-624 
(Washington: GPO, 2002), pp. 166-167. 
31 This idea is elaborated in Craig VanGrasster, “Is the Fast Track Really Necessary?,” Journal of World Trade, vol. 31, 
no. 2 (April 1997), p. 106. 
32 Inside U.S. Trade, “Grassley Presses USTR To Improve Consultations on FTAs,” July 7, 2006. 
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Side Agreements and Letters 
Outside of formal TPA statutory requirements, at times Congress has encouraged or insisted on 
additions or clarifications to trade agreements, resulting in side agreements or side letters. Side 
agreements can involve additional obligations accepted by all parties after the original trade 
agreement has been signed. The most notable examples are the environment and labor side 
agreements of NAFTA. Their status with respect to being subject to fast track procedures, 
however, can be less than clear.33 Side letters, by contrast, generally act as clarifying devices, 
usually applied to a specific issue and exist for virtually all bilateral FTAs.34 They can be used to 
assuage a particular congressional concern. Side letters are typically addressed from and to the 
top trade negotiating representative (e.g., the USTR, trade minister, or equivalent). Side 
agreements and letters accompany the agreement, but do not change its text, and both require 
official signatures of all the negotiating parties to be considered in force, although their 
enforceability so far has been untested, and so is also unclear. 
Informal Agreements 
Some Members of Congress have relied on informal commitments from the executive branch to 
address issues raised in mock markups. These often relate to special interests and concerns, and 
their fulfillment relies on a measure of good will between Congress and the executive branch. In 
the case of the CAFTA-DR implementing bill, for example, the Bush Administration made 
accommodations to sugar, textile, and labor interests to secure congressional support.35 
Possible Issues for Congress 
TPA expired on July 1, 2007. Historically, it has been common practice, although not formally 
required, to have the President request that Congress provide renewed TPA (see Appendix A). 
Some Members of Congress have criticized President Obama for delaying such a request. The 
President did ask for TPA renewal in a speech delivered on July 30, 2013.36 The decision to 
initiate legislative action on TPA may also be influenced by Congress’s desire to revamp parts of 
the 2002 law, which some view as outdated and may not reflect all key elements of the emerging 
debate. Some of the broader policy issues and technical changes that may be contemplated are 
summarized below. 
                                                 
33 For example, while Congress authorized funding for U.S. contributions and for participation in the administrative 
bodies created by the NAFTA side agreements, it did not expressly approve the agreements themselves. See 19 U.S.C. 
Sections 3471-3472. 
34 The U.S.-Israel FTA, completed in 1985, appears to be the sole exception. 
35 For details, see CRS Report RL31870, The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR), by J. F. Hornbeck. 
36 Rossella Brevetti, "Obama Calls for Trade Promotion Authority Combined with Trade Adjustment Assistance," 
Bloomberg BNA, International Trade Daily, July 31, 2013, Washington Trade Daily, President to Request TPA, TAA 
Package, July 31, 2013, and conversation with the Office of the united States Trade Representative, August 1, 2013. 
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The Need for and Timing of TPA 
From one perspective, it could be argued that TPA has not always operated smoothly and may not 
be needed if consensus can be built on passage of an FTA. When such a consensus exists, it is 
common to achieve at least a 60-vote majority in the Senate, and the House need not rely on TPA 
to adopt a special rule covering expedited legislative procedures. While a technically appealing 
point, TPA involves more than the exercise of expedited legislative procedures. It can (1) help 
build a consensus on trade policy between the executive and legislative branches; (2) signal to 
would-be FTA partners of congressional support for an FTA; and (3) ensure Congress of its role 
in the trade policy agenda by defining negotiating objectives and insisting on specific 
consultation and notification, among other requirements. 
The timing of TPA renewal is another important question. Some have suggested that the President 
should put off requesting TPA renewal until negotiations for a specific FTA are near completion, 
which would provide a compelling rationale and motivation for congressional action. Others 
argue that Congress would be better served if TPA were addressed early in the negotiation 
process. Early action would allow Congress to weigh in prior to the end of negotiations on the 
critical matters of negotiation objectives and consultation discussed above. Congress may wish to 
consider these and other aspects of TPA in determining whether and how to proceed with a 
renewed authority. 
Definition and Scope of Negotiating Objectives 
The Trade Act of 2002 broadened and updated U.S. trade negotiating objectives. Since then, 
however, the structure of trade has changed and the issues have become much more complex, 
rendering many of the negotiating objectives under the Trade Act of 2002 out of date. What some 
now refer to as a “21st century trade agreement” may include negotiating objectives not foreseen 
in previous TPA renewals. Current TPP negotiations, for example, emphasize new or more 
nuanced issues such as the treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), new regulatory 
cooperation and coherence, effects of trade on small- and medium-sized businesses (SMEs), and 
the implications of FTAs on global supply chains, which have come to redefine the nature of 
global trade. Congress may wish to consider these and other possible new negotiating objectives. 
The treatment of negotiating objectives in trade agreements is a primary example and remains 
perhaps among the most controversial areas for TPA renewal. Many Democrats were dissatisfied 
with the outcome in the Trade Act of 2002, leading to a largely partisan vote on passage, 
particularly in the House. Because the issue remained unresolved for many Members, they 
withheld approval of FTAs at least until after a bipartisan agreement was struck by congressional 
leadership and the Bush Administration on May 10, 2007. The so-called “May 10th Agreement” 
incorporated significant changes in labor, environment, and intellectual property rights (IPR) 
commitments for reciprocal trade agreements already negotiated with Peru, Colombia, Panama, 
and South Korea, including key elements proposed by House Democrats during the 2002 renewal 
debate.37 
                                                 
37Among important changes from previous FTAs, signatories were required to (1) adopt as fully enforceable 
commitments the five basic labor rights defined in the United Nations International Labor Organization’s (ILO) 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up (1998) Declaration, (2) adhere to numerous multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs), and (3) accept pharmaceutical intellectual property rights (IPR) provisions that 
could expedite that country’s access to generic drugs. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 
(continued...) 
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These changes have been accepted as a baseline for future trade agreements by many, but not all, 
Republicans and Democrats. Congress may wish to consider including some or all of the May 
10th Agreement commitments as part of the formal trade negotiating objectives in TPA. Some 
Democrats have raised the issue of whether further improvements might be made to these 
provisions. Alternatively, some Republicans have responded that they still have serious 
misgivings with the May 10th Agreement, and that it should not be construed as reflecting “an 
agreement on a new trade policy.”38 Therefore, these provisions may still be an important part of a 
debate on TPA renewal in the 113th Congress. 
Consultation and Notification 
Some Members of Congress have expressed dissatisfaction with executive branch execution of 
the trade negotiation consultation process required under TPA.39 The issue is a recurring one, and 
has gained new life with the TPP negotiations, for which some Members are dissatisfied with the 
quality of consultation. Key issues include defining procedures that ensure Congress can 
influence the substance of FTAs early in the negotiation process, and that it is afforded 
appropriate access to draft texts of agreements as they are being negotiated. Given the evolving 
nature of this section of TPA, it is possible that Congress may seek to clarify negotiation and 
consultation procedures. Some staff and Members have argued that they have less access to draft 
text than representatives of business and nongovernment organization (NGO) representatives. 
Members, particularly those sitting on committees with jurisdiction over trade, have repeatedly 
expressed the importance of being kept current on trade agreement negotiations so as to influence 
the text of the agreement, and later “to participate meaningfully in the drafting of the 
implementing bill.”40 
Trade Agreement Enforcement 
There is bipartisan interest in ensuring that the United States makes every effort to enforce 
commitments of its trade partners defined in trade agreements. Separate legislative efforts have 
addressed the trade enforcement issue, and President Obama has created the Interagency Trade 
Enforcement Center. Congress, however, may also wish to consider language on trade agreement 
enforcement in TPA as well. 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, 107th Cong., 1st sess., October 16, 2001, Rept. 107-249 Part 1 
(Washington: GPO, 2001), p. 54. 
38 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Finance, United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation 
Act, 112th Cong., 2d sess., September 20, 2012, Rept. 112-222 (Washington: GPO, 2012), pp. 55-58. For other 
opinions, see also ”Letter to USTR Ron Kirk from Representatives Dave Camp and Kevin Brady, and Senators Orrin 
Hatch and John Thune, December 21, 2011, and Lucien O. Chauvin, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks to Dominate 
Trade Negotiations Agenda in 2012,” Bloomberg BNA International Trade Reporter, January 26, 2012. 
39 U.S. Government Accountability Office, International Trade: An Analysis of Free Trade Agreements and 
Congressional Private Sector Consultations under Trade Promotion Authority, GAO-08-59, November 2007 and 
Inside Trade, “Grassley Presses USTR to Improve Consultations on FTAs,” World Trade Online, July 7, 2006. 
40 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, 107th 
Cong., 1st sess., October 16, 2001, Rept. 107-249 Part 1 (Washington: GPO, 2001), p. 36, 43, and 55, and in the 112th 
Congress, S. 3225, “The Congressional Oversight Over Trade Negotiations Act.” 
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Technical Considerations 
The most recent use of the TPA expedited procedures in the 112th Congress raised a number of 
technical issues that Congress may wish to reevaluate. A non-exhaustive list might include 
1. Necessary or appropriate: Congress has repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
taking a strict interpretation of using TPA only for those provisions in an 
implementing bill that are “necessary or appropriate to implement the 
agreement.”41 Yet, at times, there have been attempts to introduce provisions that 
some have viewed as challenging such a “strict” interpretation. Some Members 
may wish to define the “necessary or appropriate” language more precisely. 
Others may argue that each Congress is better served by having flexibility to 
apply this standard as it chooses. 
2. Time limitation on introduction of an FTA implementing bill: legislation 
implementing the FTAs with Colombia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea was not 
introduced until 3-4 years after the FTAs were signed. In part the delay reflected 
congressional leveraging of an FTA to press for policy changes in trade partner 
countries that fell outside the purview of the FTA. This tactic raises the issue of 
whether Congress might consider a time limit for introduction of an 
implementing bill after negotiations conclude. 
3. Changing FTA text: some argue that text changes in the U.S.-South Korea FTA 
after the negotiations had concluded were contrary to TPA and so opened up the 
possibility that approval of the FTA could have been denied on technical grounds. 
Congress may wish to consider whether TPA renewal should address this issue. 
Options for Congress 
As noted by two long-time observers of the congressional trade policy process, “The real power 
of fast track (TPA) is the underlying political compact between Congress and the President rather 
than its statutory guarantees, which are technically quite fragile.”42 There is an implied extension 
of “political compact” to relationships within Congress as well. Congress repeatedly seeks to 
develop the needed consensus on trade policy, with varying degrees of success, but generally with 
an understanding that a minimal degree of bipartisan understanding is needed to pass trade 
legislation. TPA has been a key element of this process. With the expiration of TPA on July 1, 
2007, Congress has a number of options with respect to its possible renewal. Four that span the 
spectrum are: 
• No TPA Renewal. The lack of TPA could delay action on future reciprocal trade 
agreements, but trade policy can move ahead in its absence including 
consideration of Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), 
unilateral preference arrangements (e.g., the African Growth and Opportunity 
Act—AGOA), and trade enforcement measures, among others. The United States 
                                                 
41 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001, 107th 
Cong., 1st sess., October 16, 2001, Rept. 107-249 Part 1 (Washington: GPO, 2001), p. 39. 
42 Shapiro and Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast Track, p. 1. See also Gary G. Yerkey, 
“Renewal of TPA Seen as Highly Unlikely Next Year, Particularly if Democrats Triumph,” International Trade 
Reporter, October 26, 2006, p. 1528.  
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has also conducted trade negotiations prior to having TPA authority in place. In 
addition, some Members do not support TPA because they view the expedited 
procedures as giving up too much congressional authority.  
• Extend a Targeted TPA. Congress could extend the current TPA with few or no 
revisions long enough to allow the United States to complete a specific 
agreement, such as the TPP free trade agreement. 
• Renew and Revise TPA Authority. Under this option, Congress could grant the 
President new authority with revisions to its structure, and without restricting it 
to specific agreement negotiations. 
• Grant Permanent TPA Authority. Congress could grant the President a form of 
permanent fast track/TPA in a two-tier procedure. For example, one expert 
suggested that (1) Congress could enact into law permanent fast track 
procedures; and (2) before specific negotiations could begin, both houses of 
Congress would have to pass a resolution approving the negotiations and 
objectives designed for the specific set of negotiations.43 
 
Current Legislation 
On January 9, 2014, legislation to renew TPA—the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities Act 
of 2014—was introduced in the House (H.R. 3830) and in the Senate (S. 1900). The legislation 
would reauthorize TPA for four years with the possibility of a three-year extension. The bills 
largely reflect the basic structure of previous TPA/fast-track authorizing legislation. However, 
they would make some changes, such as expanding executive branch requirements to consult with 
Congress and private sector advisers.  
As with previous TPA/fast-track statutes, the two bills also include sets of “overall trade 
negotiating objectives” and “principal trade negotiating objectives.” Included in the latter 
category are topics that were included in previous TPA statutes, albeit revised in some cases, 
including: trade in goods, trade in services, foreign investment, intellectual property, 
transparency, regulatory practices, dispute settlement and enforcement, trade in agriculture, labor, 
environment, border taxes, trade remedy laws, and textile negotiations. The bills include new 
objectives reflecting new trade policy issues that are the subject of current negotiations including 
digital trade in goods and services and cross-border data flows, state-owned and state-controlled 
enterprises, and localization barriers to trade. The bills include a provision on currency as a 
“principal trade negotiating objective.” Currency was included in the “promotion of certain 
priorities” category in the 2002 Act. The two bills also include a category of trade negotiating 
objectives called “capacity building and other priorities.” Alternative TPA reauthorization 
legislation may be introduced in the second session of the 113th Congress. 
                                                 
43 See for example Destler, Renewing Fast-Track Legislation, pp. 41-43, and Greg Mastel and Hal Shapiro, “Fast Track 
Forever?,” The International Economy, Summer 2006, pp. 54-55. 
 CRS-20 
Appendix A. Congressional Trade Agreements Authority Requested by and 
Granted to Presidents Since 1934 
President 
Requested 
Authority Source 
Received 
Authority Legislative Authority-Public Law 
Roosevelt Yes 1962 CQ Almanac, p. 254 
Congress and the Nation 1945-1964, p. 187 
Yes Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934 (P.L. 
73-316). Renewed 1937, 1940, 1943, and 1945 
Truman Yes 1962 CQ Almanac, p. 254 
Congress and the Nation 1945-1964, p. 194 
Yes Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1948 (P.L. 80-792), 
renewed in 1949 and 1951 
Eisenhower Yes Congress and the Nation 1945-1964, pp. 197, 198, and 200 Yes Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-215) 
Renewed in 1954, 1955, and 1958 
Kennedy Yes Congress and the Nation 1945-1964, pp. 192 and 203 Yes Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794) 
Johnson Yes Public Papers 1967, p. 80 Yes Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794) 
Nixon Yes Public Papers 1969, p. 1030, Congress and the Nation 
1977-80, p. 272 
No Trade agreements authority lapsed from July 1, 1967, to 
January 3, 1975. Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974. 
Ford No Trade Agreements Authority in place for nearly all of 
presidency 
Yes Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618) 
Carter Yes Public Papers 1979, pp. 1092-93 Yes Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618) 
Reagan Yes Public Papers 1988, pp. 325 and 392 Yes Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-39), Trade and 
Tariff Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-573) 
Bush I No Trade Agreements Authority in place for entire presidency Yes Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 
100-418) 
Clinton Yes CQ Almanac 2002, p. 18-2, Public Papers 1993, p. 199 Yes Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 
100-418), renewed 1993. Authority lapsed from April 15, 
1994, to August 6, 2002 
Bush II Yes Public Papers 2001, pp. 857, 920, and 932 Yes Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210) 
Obama Yes International Trade Daily, July 31, 2013 pending 2002 trade promotion authority expired on July 1, 2007 
Source: CRS, with information drawn from various issues of three major sources: the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (cited as CQ Almanac), Congressional Quarterly, 
Congress and the Nation, and the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (cited as Public Papers). 
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Appendix B.  Congressional Timeline under TPA 
Figure B-1. Congressional Timeline 
 
Source: CRS. 
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Appendix C.  A Short Guide to the Expedited 
Legislative Procedures for Passage of Trade 
Implementing Bills Under TPA44 
I. Before the formal TPA expedited procedures come into play, the House Ways and Means and 
Senate Finance Committees typically hold “mock markups” on informal drafts of the 
implementing legislation, voting to approve or disapprove. The vote and any amendments to the 
draft legislation, however, are not binding on the Administration. These meetings provide an 
important opportunity for Congress to register specific concerns and/or viewpoints with the 
Administration before it sends final implementing legislation to Congress, which initiates the 
expedited procedures. 
II. The President sends a final legal draft text of the trade agreement and a draft implementing bill 
(with supporting materials) to Congress on a day that it is in session. The draft bill may, or may 
not, reflect some or all of amendments adopted by committees in the mock markup. 
III. Identical bills are subject to mandatory introduction in each House of Congress on the day 
received. The bills are referred to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees 
jointly, with others if jurisdiction warrants.45 
IV. Each committee has 45 in session days to report the bill or it is automatically discharged and 
the bill is placed on the appropriate calendar.46 An implementing bill subject to TPA procedures is 
likely to be a revenue bill, in which case the Constitution requires that the Senate ultimately act 
on the House bill. Under these conditions, the Senate Finance Committee has until the later of the 
45th day of session after the Senate bill is introduced or the 15th day of session after the Senate 
receives the House bill. 
V. In each house, after the implementing bill is reported or discharged, any Member may offer a 
non-debatable motion to consider it. Debate is limited to 20 hours evenly divided between those 
for and against. The measure cannot be amended, and a motion or unanimous-consent request to 
suspend this restriction is not in order. If the chamber has not completed floor action by the 15th 
day after the bill is reported or discharged, any Member may bring it to a vote. 
VI. A bill passes by simple majority under the statute. Whichever House acts second (typically 
the Senate assuming the bill is a revenue bill) considers and debates its own bill, but takes its final 
vote on the bill received from the other House (typically the House of Representatives).47 This 
                                                 
44 Title XXI of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210) and Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. 
45 For example, the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement contained a provision affecting the temporary entry of business 
persons, requiring the implementing bill to be referred to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. 
46 Cumulatively, the whole process can take as long as 90 “in session” days, potentially lasting many months. 
47 In fact, the Senate can act, and has acted, on its own bill before receiving the House bill. In the case of the U.S.-Chile 
FTA implementing bill, the Senate Finance Committee reported out first. When the House bill, which was identical, 
came over, it was put on the Senate calendar directly. For the CAFTA-DR implementing bill, the Senate actually voted 
first on its own bill, necessitating a later (procedural) vote to substitute the (identical) language of the Senate bill into 
the House-passed bill when received. These proceedings in the Senate permitted final action to occur on the House 
measure, as constitutionally required. 
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procedure ensures that both houses will ultimately act on the same measure, thereby clearing it to 
be presented to the President (without the need for conference). After the implementing bill is 
signed, under its terms, the agreement enters into force for the United States when the President 
implements it by proclamation. This typically occurs after the USTR has assured the President 
that the partner country(ies) has made the legislative and regulatory changes necessary to meet all 
obligations under the trade agreement, and the President exchanges notes with the trading partner 
government providing for the agreement’s entry into force on or after a specific date.  
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